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Translating China’s Foreign Aid to Zambia Differently: 
           From View Point of Recipient Country 
 
                                                                       Abstract 
Kent Kamasumba 
International Cooperation 
Graduate School of International Studies 
Seoul National University 
 
China and Zambia established diplomatic ties on 29 October 1964. Over fifty-one years, Chinese 
and Zambian officials have continuously stated that this relationship is affirmed in the interest of 
both the Chinese and Zambian people, and it is a new type of strategic partnership portraying 
political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange. Thus, 
China-Zambia bilateral relationship is an example that promotes as a new strategic relationship 
befitting the interest of both the donor and recipient countries’. China enshrined these principles 
in its ‘China’s Africa Policy document’ in which the People’s Republic of China reassert that the 
relations with African countries as that of Zambia is based on the principles of sincerity, friendship 
and equality, mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity, and mutual support and close 
coordination between both countries. Both the Chinese and Zambian government have uphold the 
four defining principles: a new strategic partnership, economic win-win cooperation, friendship 
and sincerity, and mutual support and mutual benefit. As a reflection of this bilateral relations, 
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China’s foreign aid in form of the flow of huge capital investment continues to fuel Zambia’s 
economic development, by engaging in a Descriptive and Single Case-Study research with a views 
from a Big Push Theory, the thesis seeks to uncover whether or not the stated principles are 
positively working in Zambia’s case.      
 
Key Words:  
Foreign Aid, China- Zambia Bilateral Relations, Mutual Benefit and Win-Win, Economic 
Development  
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I. Introduction 
The diplomatic established ties between China and Zambia were made five days just after Zambia 
gained its independence from Britain on the 29 October 1964. For 5 decades now, officials from 
the two countries have continually stated that the long existing bilateral relationship is affirmed in 
the interest of both the Chinese and Zambian peoples. This relationship seen as a new type of 
strategic partnership depicting political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation 
and cultural exchange. Today the new China-Africa relationship is proving to be a new strategic 
relationship benefiting the interest of the Chinese and African peoples. The principles guiding the 
People’s Republic of  China’s government foreign policies to Africa are published in the China’s 
Africa Policy document  (China’s Africa policy document, 2006). In this document, the Chinese 
government  reasserts that China-Zambian bilateral relations, as that of other African countries, is 
very much based on the principles of sincerity, friendship and equality, mutual benefit, reciprocity 
and common prosperity, and mutual support and close coordination between both countries. 
Even though both Zambia and China are considered to be ‘southern’ countries, or developing 
countries, it is of no doubt that China is significantly more developed and powerful than Zambia, 
based on the fact that it is arguably the second largest economy after the United States of America. 
Thus in this Bilateral relationship, China plays the ‘donor’ role while Zambia is the recipient. 
Hence the ‘Aid’ game is the main center of the friendship. 
Therefore, the paper will seeks to take a closer look into the actuality of this seemingly good ‘Aid’ 
based bilateral relationship by investigating the flow of aid from China to Zambia during the past 
fifty-one years. This will be done by examining into the specific case studies that the Zambian 
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government and its people can testify of to justify the degree to which China’s official assistance 
has benefited the developing Zambia.  
 
i. Research Motivation   
The main motive to this research paper was arrived at by important questions main scholars of 
international development ask 1) Why do countries give foreign Aid? And 2) what do the receiving 
countries do with it? /how is the received aid distributed?   
Zambia represents one of the worst cases of economic decline and buildup of foreign debt in Africa 
and has frequently been quoted as an example by many scholars of Development studies. Like 
most African countries, it has undergone a series of adjustment programmers like the IMF SAPs1 
to restore economic equilibrium and growth. There has been progress with regard to some 
macroeconomic balances such as the external account, but there has not been any vigorous 
investment response. The extra resources have primarily been used to restore the external balance, 
and since Zambia had built up large foreign debts before the adjustment efforts, most of the extra 
resources have had to be devoted to debt service. This has meant that it has been very difficult for 
Zambia to increase domestic investment from the previous extremely low levels.  
Shifting its main economic dependence solely on foreign assistance from the Bretton woods 
institutions and the Western donor countries, the economic ailing Zambia found refuge in China’s 
constant interest to directly invest in the country. Considering the impressive economic growth 
rate of more than 9% China has shown in the past three decades (it has declined to over 7% since 
20132), its growing foreign direct investment and its ability to lift its more than 500 million citizens 
                                                          
1 http://www.imf.org/external/np/pfp/1999/zambia/ 
2 http://www.forbes.com/sites/ckgsb/2015/09/07/chinese-economy-slowdown-the-really-worry-is-debt/ 
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from poverty (measured by the World Bank poverty threshold of $1.25 day3), has proven China to 
be both a significant economic player and an economic development partner for Zambia.  
According to the WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution) in 2013, China’s outbound direct 
investment stock in Zambia reached US$2.2 billion up from US$144 million in 2003. In the same 
year, direct trade between the two countries reached $3.1 billion, up from US$10 million in 20034. 
With no doubt China’s huge capital investment in Zambia has contributed to the creation of 
thousands of jobs in Zambia. Further, this capital has been used to build valuable infrastructures 
for the benefit of the Zambians, which includes roads, bridges, hospitals, schools and housing units 
for the locals. 
The figures described this far are merely a fraction of how the two countries are engaged in helping 
each other’s economies. There is strong evidence that China’s investment in Zambia has benefited 
the Zambian economy and that China’s approach to fight poverty and promote development might 




ii. Research Question and Purpose (hypothesis) 
The objective of this study is to understand the difference in approach and ideology of China’s aid 
as compared to the common traditional aid donors of the OECD-DOC. This qualitative study 
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analysis will mainly focus on descriptive and case-studies research to analyze the effectiveness of 
China’s aid flow to Zambia and finding an alternative translation of the foreign aid from the 
recipient (Zambia) view point.   
In order to well understand China’s aid approaches and ideology, it is worth imagining that when 
developing its overseas aid policies, China probably had at least some options to consider: follow 
the existing aid architecture and join the OECD DAC, overlook the OECD DAC but implement 
aid ideologies, modalities, and mechanisms identical to their outline, or completely design from 
the scratch its own aid industry. As its now existing foreign cooperation policy, China has chosen 
the third option, not joining the OECD DAC and its existing aid models.  
The purpose of this research therefore is to explain: 
1) Why China’s style of aid policies are viewed as being more attractive by Aid recipient 
countries like Zambia? 
2) Should commonly accepted ideologies be the driving force for giving aid? 
3) How China’s non-intervention and no conditionality aid policies has proven to be more 
effective?  
 
Based on an educated assumption, China’s decision to seek its own new way of dealing with aid 
was based solely on the fact that OECD DAC aid policies were simply ineffective in promoting 
growth in least developed countries of the south. Today, this is a commonly acclaimed view 
especially by those who subscribe to the view that the west use aid programs as a means of attempts 
at imposing their own systems of democracy and their own forms of capitalism into Africa and 
other poor regions, and this is one of the reasons why many countries are trapped in poverty.  
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On the other hand, the reasons why China chose to sidestep the OECD when developing its aid 
policies may have been due to national interests and a long history of mutual cooperation based on 
a rational-cooperative logic. As in the example of Sino-Zambia relations, China’s aid policies 
today are largely the result of a historical process that dates back to South-South cooperation 
during the early Cold War period. 
 
Therefore, China’s continued cooperation with most of the nations of the south can be explained 
by a revisionist framework with the ‘Big Push’ theory at core. The existing new China’s aid 
paradigm is part of the “Beijing Consensus”, and specifically, the policy of “rational” non-
conditionality as one of the fundamental differences from existing traditional aid paradigms 
(Kurlantzick, 2013).  
 
The main Hypothesis this paper raise is that; China’s foreign assistance to other developing 
countries is more likely to be based upon the ‘Big Push’ theory, and in relation to Zambia the more 
‘Big Push’ oriented China’s aid policies are, the more the country’s economy is growing. Also 
looking at China’s continued massive investments in Zambia and how this has been of benefit 
from both sides, it can be concluded that the more ‘Big Push’ centered cooperation, the more aid 
effectiveness. Therefore in exploring the puzzle of the non-conditionality and ‘Big Push” of 
China’s aid, China's increasing development cooperation to Zambia is considered in the larger 
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II. Literature Review  
i. Conceptualization of Foreign Aid and Foreign Aid Motivation 
In general, foreign aid is defined as the transfer of money, good, and resources from one 
government to another. Foreign economic aid is defined as bilateral official development 
assistance (ODA). (Morgenthau 1962)Official foreign aid includes private flows, grants, loans, 
and technical assistance, which should be non-commercial in form and concessionary5. According 
to Hans Morgenthau, there are six types of foreign aid, which includes humanitarian foreign aid, 
subsistence foreign aid, military foreign aid, bribery, prestige foreign aid, and foreign aid for 
economic development. Both the donor and recipient governments’ task is to identify concrete 
situations and environment with the appropriate type of foreign aid.  Morgenthau further adds that 
sometimes different types of foreign aid are needed simultaneously and the ultimate goal is related 
to political concern6.  
 
In the book ‘The Power of Nations’ Klaus Knorr argued that the use of foreign aid is one of major 
instrument for exercising national power internationally7. In this 1975 publication, Knorr indicated 
three important uses of foreign economic and military aid to which donor states have commonly 
resorted to; first use is to give support to a country or regime, secondly is to achieve or preserve 
one-sided influence over the general posture of the recipient toward the donor or toward an 
                                                          




7 Klaus Eugen Knorr, The Power of Nations : The Political Economy of International Relations(New York: 
Basic Books, 1975).p166. 
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international rival of the donor, or to reduce the influence of that rival, and the third reason is to 
compel the donor government to change or maintain a particular policy. Among the three points 
Knorr indicates, all of them are description of current aid industry players including China’s aid 
to Zambia. 
 
Scholars of political science and economics have long debated on the issues of foreign aid 
distribution and its motivation. Political scientists have argued that bilateral aid transactions are 
invariably motivated by political or diplomatic factors, while economists have tended to focus 
more upon the impact of foreign aid on recipient’s economy. In the book “Aid to Africa”, political 
scientist Carol Lancaster argues that donor governments frequently wish to pursue “high 
diplomatic politics” with foreign aid by providing it in exchange for important foreign policy 
objectives, such as gaining diplomatic recognition, establishing military bases, obtaining a trade 
agreements, or bolstering a preferred regime through the economic and political support that aid 
brings (Lancaster, 1999). She further mentions that foreign aid can be used for “low diplomatic 
politics,” in pursuit of less pressing but useful goals. For example, aid may be the entry price for 
maintaining a cordial relationship with a recipient government, particularly when other foreign 
governments are also providing aid8. 
 
Other approaches that can be considered in understanding the foreign aid motivation is by 
analyzing the dynamics of bilateral aid transactions through the donor approach and the recipient 
approach. In her best-selling book “Dead Aid”, Dambisa Moyo argues that the donor approach 
offers an explanation for bilateral aid transactions from donor’s perspective, with the assumption 
                                                          
8 Lancaster, Carol. Aid to Africa: So much to do, so little done. University of Chicago Press, 1999. 
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being that the interaction between donor and recipient is always initiated by the donor who actively 
select recipient countries in accordance with various considerations9. She further adds that donors 
have their own motives for providing aid to the recipients while without really knowing the donor’s 
motives, recipient governments become obligated to donors once they receive the aid. Thus, 
donors have traditionally utilized foreign aid as a means of exerting some measure of influence 
upon their recipient counterparts. In this scenario, we can therefore derive an assumption that there 
is a positive relationship between foreign policy and foreign aid policy. Considering the donor’s 
aid distribution patterns, for example the selection of recipient countries and the aid contents, 
inevitably determined by its diverse foreign policy goal.  
 
On the other hand, the standpoint of the recipient is in contrast to the political motivation of the 
donor. In most cases, economic factors do replace political factors as the recipient’s main 
determinant in deciding whether to accept aid programs.10 Since the recipient countries consider 
receiving aid from economic aspect point of view, rather than donor’s political intention, they are 
more concerned of whether the aid programs meet their need for the development. Under the 
circumstance that there may be two politically antagonistic donor countries both competing for the 
recipient’s diplomatic cooperation. Ironically, even though the recipient are fully aware of the 
donors’ political intentions, when it comes to choosing the donor, the recipient in most cases ignore 
the political pressure and tend to take account which aid program is more beneficial than the other 
for its developmental needs, like in the example of African countries shifting from western donors 
to China11 
                                                          
9 Moyo, D. (2009). Dead aid: Why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa. Macmillan. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Moyo, D. (2011). How the West was Lost: Fifty Years of Economic Folly--and the Stark Choices Ahead. 
Macmillan. 
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ii. The ‘Big Push’ model 
The macroeconomic theoretical basis to promoting financial aid first appeared in 
1950s and had the starting point of the “Big Push Model”. In the African context, this model briefly 
states that Africa is poor because the continent is stuck in a “poverty trap” and to get out of the 
poverty trap, they need a large aid finance increased in investments, which would be the “Big 
Push”. In the book “The Bottom Billion” Paul Collier extensively explains the main causes of how 
a poverty trap arises12. 
Furthermore the Harrod-Domar growth model can be extensively be used to discuss the 
mechanisms of how a country can end up in a poverty trap. The model explains that “a determined 
level of savings is necessary to promote stability and growth of the economies and if saving is too 
low to keep up with population growth and the depreciation of capital, then per capita growth will 
be zero or negative (Easterly 2005)13. Thus, some development economists in postulate a desirable 
per capita growth rate and calculate the “investment requirement” to meet this target; the distance 
between the low domestic saving rate and the “investment requirement” which is called the 
“Financial Gap”. In this sense, the role of aid in accordance to the ‘Big Push’ theory is to fill this 
financial gap.14 
 
By modifying the growth model and introducing the trade deficit, the two-gap models developed 
by Chenery and Bruno (1962)  introduced the fiscal gap as another constraint requiring external 
                                                          
12 Collier, P. (2008). The bottom billion: Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it. 
Oxford University Press. 
13 Easterly, William The Ghost of Financing Gap How the Harrod-Domar Policy Paper L807, 1997 
 
14 Ibid. 
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financing to explain government’s tax effort in a noninflationary way. The two major conclusions 
that emerge from the literature of economic development with respect to the effectiveness of aid 
are that:  
(i) Foreign aid should aim at raising domestic savings to a level sufficient to finance the 
investment needed to sustain the targeted growth rate of GDP. 
(ii) Foreign aid should not discourage the recipient countries from seeking to relieve the 
foreign exchange constraint by improving competitiveness and export diversification. 
On a contrary, it is worth mentioning that empirical relationship between the size of foreign 
assistance and its impact on both the GDP growth rate as well as domestic savings behavior has 
been extensively debated by numerous scholars of both development studies and political scientists. 
Some studies have questioned the usefulness of aid and showed that there is little or no correlation 
between aid inflows to developing countries and their GDP growth rates (Mosley, 1987). He also 
argued that there is a negative impact of increased foreign aid on domestic savings. However, other 
studies do not confirm these relationships and there are a multitude of studies that have generally 
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iii. ODA vs. Foreign Aid : OECD vs. China’s definition 
The literature on foreign aid is extensive based on different stance and school of thought, as a 
result, any attempt to review of it will cover only some of the highlights. In this section the research 
focuses on concepts and definitions of foreign aid as presented by traditional international 
organizations and by independent China, as well as other research on the linkage between foreign 
aid and economic growth.   
 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) categorizes two forms of 
development aid programs: 
1. Official development assistance (ODA) consists of technical aid, official grants, or loans 
promoting economic development and welfare, and having concessional terms, with a grant 
element of at least 25 percent.15 
2. Official development finance (ODF) consists of “non-concessional development lending 
by multilateral financial institutions” and “other official flows for development purposes 
(including refinancing loans) which have too low a grant element to qualify as ODA.”16 
 
 
On the other hand the Information provided in the first ever released white paper on China’s 
foreign aid does not provide a clear definition for comparison with the OECD terminologies. It 
instead only states that its foreign aid represents “mutual help between developing countries, 
                                                          
15 http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm 
16 Ibid. 
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focuses on practical effects, accommodates recipient countries’ interests, and strives to promote 
friendly bilateral relations and mutual benefit through economic and technical cooperation with 
other developing countries.”17 
 
Despite having little information on China’s official developmental aid, available official Chinese 
sources explicitly distinguish three categories of foreign aid and government-sponsored 
investment activities (FAGIA): 1)“grants (aid gratis), 2)interest-free loans and 3)concessional 
loans. The first two come from China’s state budgets, while concessional loans are provided by 
the Export-Import Bank of China as designated by the Chinese government”.18  Grants provided 
by the Chinese government compare favorably with the OECD definition of ODA. While Chinese 
loan terms are more complicated, however, and require a more detailed analysis. 
Several other studies provide explicit descriptions of the types and forms of concessional and 
interest-free loans that comprise most China’s programs. Like in an intensive research by (Charles 
Wolf, 2013) the data collected in their study indicates the average loan extended has been for about 
$850 million.19 In other studies they identified China’s concessional loan terms, with scheduled 
drawdowns and repayment over 15 years and an additional five-year grace period.20 These loan 
terms clearly reflect subsidization by the lending institutions. Loans for aid purposes may also 
include collateralization and designation of revenues generated by exports to China of specific 
commodities, and sometimes they may be tied to procurement of equipment and technical services 
                                                          
17 China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation (2013) Information Office of the State Council.p.3. 
18 Ibid 
19 Ibid. 
This figure includes all types of loans included in this study, namely commercial, concessional, and interest-free 
loans. 
20 Paul Hubbard, Aiding Transparency: What We Can Learn About China Exim Bank’s Concessional 
Loans, Center for Global Development, 2007. 
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imported from China. Chinese concessional loans also include a stipulation that at least 50 percent 
of the loan is tied to the purchase of Chinese goods. Such conditions attached to China’s programs 
complicate their comparison to “development assistance” as defined by the OECD. As noted above, 
the OECD definition requires that ODA must have “a grant element of at least 25 percent”21 but 
China’s FAGIA fall short of this threshold, the deficient component would register at least as ODF. 
The figure below by Deborah Brautigam does clearly show an example of China’s aid content.  
 
 
Figure1. “Global Development Finance Table” 
 
Source: Brautigam 2010 ( Chinese Development Aid in Africa) 
 
 
                                                          
21 Ibid. 
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The paradox of aid definition is one that is somewhat complex to understand as many questions 
arise; is foreign aid only limited to the money that one government gives to another government? 
How about the roads or schools built in a poor country by the rich country? What about donor 
government subsidies to promote exports or subsidies to promote private investment in a recipient 
country? All these example questions in literal respect does qualify as form of foreign aid despite 
the fact that such aid does not fit within the OECD’s strict sense of “ODA” definitions. China’s 
export credits and grants/subsidies that support private investment may not normally qualify as 
ODA, but in this thesis Brautigam’s definition of aid: “the full portfolio of tools used by an activist, 
developmental government with a clear vision of what it needs to do to promote its national goals 
overseas”22. In other words, Chinese foreign aid for international development goes beyond the 




iv. Not ‘Aid’, but ‘Trade’ 
In the discussion session of this thesis proposals to Zambia will be made, and most will be based 
on supporting Zambia to grow into self-reliance. Zambia is a clear case of essential example to 
which foreign aid created a vicious circle in which institutional weakness on the recipient side 
encourage donors’ practices that undermined national ownership of aid. But, if aid can just be 
effective in stable environments, what to do with poor countries with poor environments as the 
case of Zambia, for example? According to Dambisa Moyo, an economist from Zambia, aid 
apparatus has not only come to trap poor and indebted Zambia but she mentions it is the root cause 
                                                          
22 Brautigam 2010 
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of poverty. The central argument of her book “Dead Aid”23, is that “aid is the fundamental cause 
of poverty and therefore eliminating aid is critical to spur growth in ailing African states”. She 
uses the common statement that aid distorts incentives among policy makers and society at large 
(Moyo, 2009).The solution proposed by Moyo may be criticized as quite radical: “cut definitely 
aid and adopt a strategy of access to international markets, supported by microfinance, trade, FDI 
and remittances” (Moyo, 2009). According to Moyo, the access of African countries to the 
international market will operate also as a toll of selectivity and in this sense can serve as an 
incentive to improvements in governance. 
 
The linkages between trade and aid have also been examined in other researches, with mixed 
results. Wagner shows that approximately 50 percent of foreign aid in the 1990s was tied with 
exports.24This study also showed that an increase in exports in the amount of 133 percent of total 
aid is associated with aid disbursements. Further a research conducted by Lloyd and colleagues in 
2000 has also shown a linkage between trade and aid, though its direction and magnitude are 
unknown.25  Most of the researchers of foreign aid agree that exports are more beneficial to the 
recipient countries than tied aid and under reasonable conditions, are more beneficial than 
associated finance or low-concessional aid26 
                                                          
23 Moyo, D. (2011). How the West was Lost: Fifty Years of Economic Folly--and the Stark Choices Ahead. 
Macmillan. 
24 Don Wagner, “Aid and Trade—An Empirical Study,” Journal of the Japanese and International 
Economies, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2003, pp. 153–173. 
 
25 Tim Lloyd, Mark McGillivray, Oliver Morrissey, and Robert Osei, “Does Aid Create 
Trade? An Investigation for European Donors and African Recipients,” European Journal of 
Development Research, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2000, pp. 107–123. 
 
26 Oliver Morrisey and Howard White, “Evaluating the Concessionality of Tied Aid,” The Manchester School, 1996, 
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In a concluding remark, the intensive literature reviewed thus far on foreign aid covers the 
relationship between foreign aid and economic development, including the linkage between aid 
and trade, as well as previous research on China’s foreign aid approach and ideology in comparison 
to the OECD-DAC while reaching to a conclusion that “ODA is one type of foreign aid”. Also 
earlier literatures on the economic development effects of aid in recipient countries yielded mixed 
and inconclusive results, while more recent papers have shown no statistically significant linkage 
between these two variables. Research on the connection between aid and trade has also been 
mixed, with some prior research showing a significant boost to trade from aid, while other papers 
have not been able to determine the direction or magnitude of effects. This research will strive to 
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III. Analytical Framework 
The framework of analysis undertaken in this research is reflected simply summarized in the 
diagram below; catabolized in three sections: Aid as the Dependent variable, Donor motivation as 
Independent Variable, and finally the three cross-case themes representing the valuations of the 
stated variables.   
 
 
Before analyzing the dependent and independent variables, first it is important to understand the 
backbone of the thesis and that is it figure out the foreign aid based bilateral relationship between 
China and Zambia. Therefore the first vital questions to be examined are; Why aid to Zambia? 
And Why China’s Aid?    
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i. Why Aid to Zambia 
Zambia is a very challenging country to study the effectiveness of foreign aid not only because of 
lack of availability of recorded documents on the received aid but it’s also the reason of the 
government not being in control of managing and regulating the flow of all sought of foreign aid. 
As argued in a report of the World Bank, in Zambia more than in most other sub-Sahara African 
countries, financial aid from the international donor community over the last two decades has been 
tied to the implementation of economic policy reform27. But it is arguable that the conditinalities 
combined with a complicated relationship between donors and the government of Zambia have 
damaged the effectiveness of a big amount of money which was one of the major flux of aid in 
this developing country for many years. Thus, the relationship with the government of Zambia 
with the donor institutions as well as to the bilateral relations with China is something very 
important to this thesis analysis especially when considering the problem of lack of ownership. 
 
Since the independency from England, in 1964, Zambia has been extremely dependent on foreign 
aid mostly from the western donors and Bretton wood institutions, while at the same time an 
increasing number of Zambians have constantly seen their social and economic conditions 
worsening. As the World Bank data on Zambia indicates, there is evidences that over the last 35 
years the indicators of poverty have had increased in a sense that puts this country as one of the 
poorest in sub-Saharan Africa.28 Further the WB data shows how for the most of the 1990s a 
staggering 65-70 % of the population has been living on or below the poverty line. Given the 
                                                          
27 http://data.worldbank.org/country/zambia 
28 Ibid. 
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political and economic role of foreign aid in the country it is highly relevant to inquire how well 
the aid from the long time aid donors reflects the pressing issue of poverty reduction.  
 
Until 2005, after Zambia like many other Sub-Sahara Countries reached the HIPC29, most of its 
aid was in loan form from the western donors. But its international relations shifted towards 
favoring China’s assistance and since then China has surpassed the western donors in terms of 
official assistance to Zambia. Additionally, as many other China’s aid beneficiaries in Africa, 
Zambia is very unique in a sense that massive investments from China can be traced back to the 
US$400 million, in the form of a long-term interest-free loan for the massive construction of the 
TAZARA Railway.30 Also unlike other recipient countries, Zambia’s development cooperation 
with China is clearly inclined in the MoU and all the new projects of constructions and trade related 
aid have to abide by the agreements made by the two government. For example the use of primary 
resources in infrastructural development have to be sourced in Zambia and usually the projects 
consists of at least more than 50% of domestic sub-constructors and only high expatriates can be 
imported from China.31           
 
 
ii. Why China’s Aid 
With the world’s second largest economy, China has proven its capacity to engage in substantial 
programs of development assistance and government investment in any and all of the emerging 
                                                          
29 www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2005/pr0580.htm 
30 See case study on TAZARA Railway 
31Zambian Government Ministry of Transport, Works, Supply and Communication. http://www.mtwsc.gov.zm/ 
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market countries. In the first decade of the 21st century, it has expanded and directed this capacity 
in 93 countries for both the benefit of the recipients and its own interests. (Charles Wolf, 2013) 
 
Up until the early 2000s little was known about the extent of China’s activities but this has been 
changing in recent years. By using several data sources and aggregation methods, researchers at 
RAND built a database to describe China’s foreign assistance programs.32 It assessed the scale, 
trends, and composition of these programs in six regions including Africa. Finally, it derived 
references and insights from the analysis that may enhance understanding of these programs and 
policies pertaining to them. In the this study the main interest is understanding the scale, trends, 
and composition of China’s foreign aid and FAGIA in Zambia  
 
In most bilateral cooperation, China’s aid program  have shifted over the years, with emphasis on 
development of increased foreign supplies of energy resources, as well as supplies of ferrous and 
nonferrous natural mineral resources. Long term interest-free loans finance many of these 
programs and feature substantial subsidization, but are also accompanied by some meticulous debt-
servicing conditions that distinguish China’s foreign aid from the grant financing that characterizes 
development aid provided by western nations of the OECD-DAC.  
 
Furthermore, China’s FAGIA is much broader than development assistance programs conducted 
by the Traditional donors like the United States.33 Official Chinese sources explicitly distinguish 
three categories of FAGIA: grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans. The first two are 
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funded by China’s state finances, while the Export-Import Bank of China funds the third. Many of 
these programs fall below the grant element of at least 25 percent that characterizes foreign aid 
programs of other nations and also have requirements that goods purchased for them be at least 50 
percent of Chinese origin. (Charles Wolf, 2013) 
It can be argued that before 2000, China’s FAGIA was distinctly limited in scale and content, as, 
indeed, was China’s role in the global economy. As a result of its remarkable and sustained 
economic growth, China’s shares of global trade and global product increased, as did the resources 
available to expand its FAGIA34. Because future growth of the Chinese economy depends on 
increasing supplies of natural resources, especially energy-related resources, much of China’s 
assistance has sought to help countries developing such resources. The financial muscle of China’s 
aid is mainly provided by large loans from China’s Export-Import Bank, the China Development 
Bank (CDB), and the China Africa Development Fund (which is within the CDB) (Brautigam, 
2009). Several state-owned enterprises, including China’s National Overseas Oil Company, the 
China National Petroleum Corporation, and the China Petrochemical Company, provide technical 
and financial support.35 The FAGIA formal management structure is topped by the Ministry of 
Commerce, which is responsible to China’s State Council, and ultimately to the Standing 
Committee of the Communist Party’s Political Bureau, the pinnacle of decision-making36 power 
in China. Much remains unknown about this structure, including the precise role of the major state-
owned enterprises in the planning, decision making, and operation of China’s programs, as well 
as how independently the CDB operates in providing aid. 
 
                                                          
34 (Charles Wolf, 2013) 
35 (Brautigam, 2009) 
36 Ibid. 
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The research findings by the RAND researchers show the scale of China’s FAGIA is very large, 
shockingly many times larger than the separate grant-aid development assistance programs 
conducted by the United States, Europe, Japan, and other donor countries (Charles Wolf, 2013). 
Newly pledged aid from China was $124.8 billion in 2009, $168.6 billion in 2010, and $189.3 
billion in 2011, all far above the $1.7 billion it pledged in 2001. The 2010 and 2011 pledged 
amounts were equivalent to about 3 percent of China’s gross domestic product. It is worth 
mentioning that this scaling may be misleading because China’s FAGIA programs, are financed 
by subsidized loans and also most of the available data is controlled by the state. 
 
 
iii. Contextual Approach 
In order to analyze the relation between China’s foreign aid flow and Zambia’s economic 
development indicators based on the assistance received, this research paper applies two contextual  
approaches, which are used to analyze the pattern of foreign aid tendencies that both the donor and 
recipient government makes within the framework of the country’s foreign policy goals and 
approaches.  
 
The first one is the ‘Aid Paradox’ approach. In this perspective, foreign aid is identified as a 
dependent variable which as guided by the donor’s foreign policy goal, while the recipient 
government tends to be overwhelmed hence its weakness in negotiations of aid This approach 
emphasizes that both internal and external settings should be taken into account as relevant 
background. When it comes to analyzing the aid giving behaviors, it is important to focus on the 
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donor’s decision making process. Donor country’s policy-makers considers the nation’s position 
within the structure of external environment as well as the domestic climate, such as national 
interests and political and social situation.37 Since aid giving is to be a complex activity, donor’s 
aid behaviors reflect donor’s different foreign policy concerns.38 Thus, by applying contextual 
approach, this paper aims at analyzing the formulation of China’s aid behavioral pattern and the 
relationship between the aid behavior and its foreign policy objectives.  
 
The second approach is donor motivation. This approach focuses on analysis of donor’s aid 
distribution behavior. Donors have various motivation and consideration when selecting recipient 
countries.39 Foreign aid in this sense can be seen as reward or trade-off. The donor assumes that 
since aid package is committed to the recipient, the recipient government recognizes its obligation 
to reciprocate whenever the opportunity arises. Therefore, foreign aid is utilized as a means of 
exerting some influence upon their recipients by donors (Moyo, 2009). Donors pursue certain 
foreign policy goals by providing foreign aid and expect a win-win situation for both donor and 
recipient countries. Thus, by applying donors approach, the paper will attempt to analyze the 
China’s aid distribution pattern in focus on why it gives aid, in what sectors of interest and the 
implications of the aid to Zambia in this case. 
 
 
iv. Donor motivation and Recipient Response 
                                                          
37 Teh-chang Lin, "Framework for Analyzing Communist China's Foreign Policy," Issues & studies (1991). 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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China’s foreign policy in Zambia and a history of the foreign aid implementations in Africa is 
sketched out throughout this paper to provide the analytical background. Three objective case 
studies on Zambia will be analyzed and will be examined separately in an attempt to show effective 
implications of China’s foreign aid and foreign policy’s correlation. 
 
In the first part, the paper focuses on the ‘China’s aid  approach ‘ mutual benefits and win-win’, 
bringing out first the historical background of China’s aid presence in Africa as a whole, then 
secondly look into Zambia-China relations. Further in the thesis will categorize well recognized 
major case studies that may clearly describe the mutual cooperation between the two countries. 
The case studies will be chosen from; first infrastructure, second case will be from health and lastly 
will be on Education. 
Finally after exhausting everything, the thesis paper will discuss possible new approaches for the 
recipient country Zambia in finding effective means to strengthen its aid bargaining in order to 
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IV. China’s Aid Approach- ‘Mutual Benefit and Win-Win’ 
i. History of China’s Aid to Africa 
The institutionalization of China’s foreign aid policy began in the 1960s with the announcement 
of the “Eight Principles of Chinese Foreign Aid”. During a press conference in Ghana in 1964, 
China’s Premier Zhou Enlai introduced the eight characteristics of Chinese aid: 
 
(1.) Equality and mutual benefits; (2) respect for sovereignty and no conditionality; (3) reflecting 
the needs of the recipient countries; (4) assistance in self-reliance; (5) emphasis on quick results; 
(6) high-quality material and equipment; (7) full acquisition of technology by the local staff; and 
(8) Chinese aid experts meeting the same standards as local counterparts.40 
 
China’s no conditionality, the promise of fast results, and “win-win” scenario attracted many 
countries to seek aid from the new emerging donor. Also what was unique is that China’s aid 
mostly consisted of building industrial infrastructure and sending experts to aid recipient countries. 
 
According to Brautigam, “China’s engagement in Africa simply repeats patterns established by 
the West, and especially Japan in China”. China also realized that foreign aid was successful in 
vying support from newly independent African nations. Votes at the United Nations, skillfully 
organized by Tanzania, gave China its seat back, which was occupied by Taiwan. Soon after, China 
began aid programs in thirteen additional African countries and by 1966 there were 36 aid 
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37 | P a g e  
 
recipients of China’s aid in Africa alone (Brautigam, 2009). From the beginning, China saw the 
power of foreign aid. The country continues to use foreign assistance to achieve its diplomatic 
goals in reducing support for Taiwan.41 
 
China’s foreign assistance to Africa is for sure not a new phenomenon. It dates back to 1950 one 
year after the PRC was established. China’s foreign assistance program to the African region 
gradually transformed throughout the decades, yet it remains to embody the East Asian Aid Model 
of linking aid, trade and investment. From the years 2010 to 2012, Africa received the most amount 
of aid from China’s foreign assistance fund at 51.8 percent with most of the assistance going 
towards infrastructure and economic development projects. China’s engagement in Africa can be 












                                                          
41 Ibid. 




Figure 2: illustrates China-Africa Trade volume 
 
Source: White Paper. China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation (2013)   
 
Trade and access to natural resources have increasingly played a central role in its current aid 
program, but it is not the only purpose for assistance. China describes its relationship with African 
countries as a win-win situation. It provides large amounts of foreign assistance and investments 
into development projects, while upholding strong trade and economic relations. China created an 
investment fund solely for African nations called the China-Africa Development Fund (CAD), 
which helps to stimulate Chinese investments on the continent. Every three years China and Africa 
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gather for the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)42 to discuss political, economic, and 
social relations between the two sides. 
 
President Xi Jinping’s first overseas trip as Head of State was to Africa. The visit is not an 
uncommon practice for Chinese leaders. However, President Xi’s visit showed the evolving 
patterns of China’s policy toward Africa. In 2013, China’s special envoy for African Affairs, 
Zhong Jianhua, visited Africa more than ten times to mediate the conflict in South Sudan. This 
move was unprecedented for a country that prides itself on not interfering in other countries’ 
domestic affairs. China’s significant oil stake may have prompted the intervention, but regardless 
of the motive, the country is making its presence known in the region.43 
 
Fast forward, RANDS researchers found out that Africa came in second in terms of aid received 
from China. Prior to 2004, many of the programs of China’s aid focused on other forms, such as 
debt cancellation and humanitarian aid. But since then, and especially following China-Africa 
summits in 2003 and 2006, assistance shifted to a mix of natural-resource programs and, especially, 
infrastructure; including hydropower, road, and railway projects across Africa44. As part of China’s 
diplomatic efforts, the programs have also included construction of stadiums and parliamentary 
buildings. Oil was the purpose of most natural-resource development programs in Africa, but other 
projects have sought to develop resources of gold, platinum, diamonds, uranium, and aluminum. 
 
                                                          
42 See http://www.focac.org/eng/ 
43 (Brautigam, 2009) 
44 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, between 2001 and 2011, 49 countries in Africa received approximately $175 billion 
dollars in pledged assistance, making it the second largest regional recipient of aid behind Latin 
America with $186 billion. Overall China’s interaction with Africa during this time reflected both 
political and economic interests displayed in triennial China - Africa summits (Brautigam, 2009). 
China’s engagement throughout the region grew steadily, peaked in 2008, and declined between 
2009 and 2011.  
 
Today, China’s foreign aid policy remains to reflect upon the “Eight Principles of Chinese Foreign 
Aid”. According to the country’s second white paper on foreign assistance published in August 
2013: When providing foreign assistance, China adheres to the principles of not imposing any 
political conditions, not interfering in the internal affairs of the recipient countries and fully 
respecting their right to independently choosing their own paths and models of development. The 
basic principles China upholds in providing foreign assistance are mutual respect, equality, 
keeping promise, mutual benefits and win-win.45 
 
The white paper, which is an overview of the country’s foreign aid from 2010-2012, closely 
resembles the policies from the 1960s. It strictly abide to no conditions, no interventions in the 
recipient country’s domestic affairs, and overall, equal and mutual benefits for both parties.46 
In the white paper, China details the allocation of its foreign assistance. From 2010 to 2012, the 
country appropriated a total of 89.34 billion yuan ($14.41 billion) in foreign assistance. China’s 
foreign aid consists of three types. Concessional loans account for most of the foreign assistance 
at 49.76 billion yuan ($8 billion) or 55.7 percent and were mainly used in manufacturing projects, 
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infrastructure projects and providing machinery and electronic supplies. Grants account for 32.32 
billion yuan ($5.2 billion) or 36.2 percent of the total value and were mainly used for social welfare 
projects, emergency humanitarian aid, funding human resources development, etc. Meanwhile, 
interest-free loans comprise 7.26 billion yuan ($1.16 billion) or 8.1 percent of the foreign 
assistance value and were mainly used to construct public facilities and projects to better people’s 
livelihoods. 
  
In the three years examined, China provided foreign assistance to 121 countries. These include 
nine in Oceania, twelve in Europe, nineteen in Latin America and the Caribbean, 30 in Asia and 
51 in Africa. Most of China’s foreign assistance went to Africa at 51.8 percent and Asia received 
the second most amount at 30.5 percent. Latin America and the Caribbean, Oceana, Europe and 
other unspecified regions received 8.4, 4.2, 1.7, and 4.2 percent, respectively. The distribution of 















Figure 3: illustrates the distribution of China’s foreign assistance by geographical region. 
 
 
Source: White Paper. China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation (2013)   
 
 
Additionally, Majority of China’s foreign assistance was allocated to the least developed countries 
at 52.1 percent.  Most LDCs are located in Africa, which aligns with China giving the largest 
amount of its foreign aid to the African region. 
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 Figure 4: shows a graph of China’s foreign assistance distribution by income level. 
 
 




The white paper further reviews that most of China’s foreign assistance was used for economic 
infrastructure followed by social and public infrastructure, which accounted for 44.8 percent and 
27.6 percent of the projects, respectively.  
 
China’s white paper points out the importance of “Improving Infrastructure” in which it explains 
the assistance “to help recipient countries with much needed infrastructure construction”. Other 
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sectors that received assistance were in agriculture, industry, goods and materials, human resources 
development cooperation and humanitarian aid. According to the white paper, China engaged in 
projects such as conducting technical cooperation, dispatching medical teams and volunteers and 
providing goods and supplies.  
 
 




Source: China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid 2010-2012 
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This important document also illustrates China’s efforts in capacity building and the importance 
of global partnership, both of which can be seen as China’s soft power.47 The document mentions 
of human resources development in which Chinese nationals have been sent overseas to share their 
knowledge and expertise to those in developing countries like in the case of Zambia for the past 
three decades have been receiving Chinese medical experts. In addition, foreign officials have been 
invited to China to participate in seminars that covered topics from economics and management 
to vocational education. China also held training sessions for about 10,000 personnel from 
countries receiving aid on areas of health care, environmental protection, and disaster relief and 
prevention to name a few.48  
 
China’s white paper was solely used to indicate how much African countries have benefited more 
from the China’s aid compared to other regions. Also with the seriousness of enforcing efforts in 
reducing poverty and improving the livelihoods of developing countries in the world, China seems 
more determinant in achieving this as it has always been clear that its aid is mutual based 
cooperation for economic and social development. 
 
 
ii. Comparison: USAID 
In comparison sense, it is very clear the United States and China have varying interests in Zambia 
in terms of foreign assistance and this has been so since the birth of Zambia in 1964. In general 
the focus, approaches and ideology of foreign assistance by these global super power donors is 
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different from each other mainly because of their foreign policies. For example, the United States 
allocates most of its foreign aid into Zambia’s health sector, while on the other hand China 
distributes most of its assistance to infrastructure-based projects. 
In this section, the paper will try to analyze the comparison of the two donor countries focus on 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-Zambia Country Development 
Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) as the focal point to explain the difference with China’s aid 
approach to Zambia. 
 
Since Zambia’s independence in 1964, the United States has provided close to $4 billion49  to 
support the country’s economic, political and social development and to respond to major crises, 
such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and periodic droughts.  The United States government records that the 
USAID assistance to Zambia focuses on: 
[ (1) improving the health of all Zambians, with a particular focus on women and vulnerable 
children; (2) reducing the incidence and impact of HIV/AIDS and other illnesses; (3) increasing 
agriculture-led economic development to reduce rural poverty and food insecurity; (4) mitigating 
climate change and environmental risks; (5) raising education quality and learner performance; 
and (6) advancing civil society, governance, and public service delivery.]50 
 
In 2010 alone, the total official development assistance (ODA) to Zambia was $877 million51. The 
U.S. Government’s share of annual received foreign aid was 30%, making the United States one 
                                                          
49 U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations July 1, 1945 – September 30, 2009. And, FACTSInfo 
for FY 2010. 
50 www.usaid.gov/zambia 
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of the largest bilateral donor with China in Zambia. The biggest amount of the USAID are mostly 
project-based, though in some cases the aid is allocated in small scale support modest non-project 
assistance  called; Sector Wide Approaches (SWAp) in Health and Education with disbursements 
strongly tied to previous attainment of agreed-upon framework by the government of Zambia. 
However, in spite of the Zambian Government requested preference for budget support, the 
amount of USAID’s resources and the leadership that USAID and the United States Government 
bring to the sector groups, especially in Health and HIV/AIDS, does make the Zambian 
government to include US funded project assistance as the same with the government aid policy 
and programs52. Thus USAID strategies and programs have always continuously concentrated on 
programs within sector and initiative driven strategic objectives which in fact make no room for 
the recipient government to have no say at all. 
 
In a nut shell, USAID has continuously maintained a presence in Zambia for 51 years now, 
supporting and implementing programs with targets on economic growth, health improvement, 
education, promoting democracy and governance, and humanitarian assistance53. Furthermore,  
according to the CDCS 2011-2015, the United States of America and its donor partners have 
consistently supplied foreign through monitory assistance and other resources to help end 
Zambia’s development challenges. These programs includes smallholder productivity, rural 
income generation, improved health, and improved education. But the reality of the matter is that 
while these approaches have clearly helped most beneficiaries in the country, they have not led to 
the sustainable or systemic changes that are required to move Zambia forward54. Therefore it is 
                                                          
52 see https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/USAIDZambiaCDCS30Sept2011.pdf 
53 Ibid 
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worth seeking to better understand in deep research what is holding Zambia back and what USAID, 
the Zambian Government, and the donor community need to do differently to turn Zambia’s 
development around. 
 
Now for comparison purposes, these are some of the significant differences between United States 
and Chinese foreign aid in Zambia. According to the USAID official publications, the overall ODA 
of the United States goes into health, education and population55. Thus its reflection on the patterns 
of assistance to Zambia reflected so far. As for China, nearly half of its foreign assistance to 
Zambia is allocated into economic infrastructure; like railway and road construction. 
 
Generally, aid flow into Zambia from China and United States can be summarized like this; 
economic Development receives the second most amount of U.S. aid followed by Democracy and 
Governance. The aid is used in education and governance, areas in which the United States deems 
as tools to improve societies and also allows the United States to integrate and immerse its ideals 
into developing programs so as and maintain its foreign policy influence. As for China, it provides 
the most amount of aid to Zambia’s Transport and Storage, Energy Generation and Supply of 
which both sectors are considered infrastructure projects by the Chinese government56. Also assists 
in a moderate way to Health and Education (in form of scholarships).  
 
Additionally, While the aid giving patterns of the two countries in Zambia stand at a variance, the 
same can also be referred for United States and Chinese foreign aid in Africa overall. The 
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n.p., 2014. 
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geography of foreign assistance influx by the two countries are largely difference on their 
preference of recipient country. While the United States provide aid to mostly East Africa, China 
sought out countries in the West and Southern parts of Africa.  
 
In a simple summary, the United States regards education, health and governance as channels of 
development, China views infrastructure development as a means to improve societies and 
approaches projects in a more non-interfering stand. While it also provides foreign aid to the 
education and government sectors, it is almost always in the form of materials and supplies. 
 
Because of the difference in approaches of United States and China’s foreign aid to Zambia, it may 
appear like the two donor countries are strongly competing. But looking at it in a different view, 
rather than assuming their relationship as a competition for Zambia, the differences may be argued 
as an unintended complementarity of development. China’s investment in Zambia’s infrastructure 
and the United States investment in the health sector allows for both areas to develop in a balanced 
way. Simply put, the United States and China are working separately but unintentionally 
complement each other’s efforts. 
 
 
iii. China-Zambia relations 
The Post-independence Zambia’s desire and respect for sustainable development has helped to 
continue fostering strong economic and diplomatic ties of the China-Zambia relations. This has 
been more prevalent since the introduction of multiparty political system in Zambia in 1991, 
whereas because of tight electoral competitions, elected officials are enticed to design policies 
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aimed at increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into the country and help Zambia’s 
export sector for development purposes. In the preamble of the 2006 Zambian Development 
Agency Act57, with the consideration that most sectors in the Zambia’s economy are dependent on 
foreign capital, the government of Zambia has to attract more foreign direct investment to enhance 
trade between Zambia and other countries. Therefore China has this far proven as the best partner 
Zambia can rely on for the much need FDI, and China’s one area of interest in exerting its foreign 
policies is to have trade cooperation with small economies like that of Zambia’s. 
The bilateral relations between the two countries have been constantly been reaffirmed by high-
level officials from both China and Zambia through brandishing the four defining principles 
guiding their cooperation: a new strategic partnership, economic win-win cooperation, friendship 
and sincerity, and mutual support and mutual benefit. These are signs of the distinctiveness of 
China-Zambia relations from Zambia’s relations with other countries especially those from the 
western world. For instance, during his trip to China earlier this year, President Lungu emphasized 
that “China remains a sincere friend and good partner to Zambia”58. 
In the assistance aspect, Zambia-bound assistance from China has undergone rapid transformations 
over the five decades of bilateral relations. Prior to 2004, the majority of aid was in the form of 
grants and debt cancellation. Following 2004, a mix of infrastructure and natural-resource 
development programs came to dominate China’s aid programs with Zambia. Infrastructure has 
remained the major portion of annual assistance even presently there are numerous infrastructural 
developments being undertaken by the Chinese.59 Also it is worth noting that infrastructure and 
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58 ZambiaReport News 
59 See. http://www.zda.org.zm/ 
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natural-resource programs are increasingly appearing to be complementary. Of the large amounts 
of funding for natural-resource development being received, most appreciable infrastructure 
funding are being allocated as well. Natural-resource programs generally precede infrastructure 
programs. It can be conclude that this mix of infrastructure and natural-resource programs appears 
to follow Chinese needs: “Once mineral extraction agreements are in place, China seeks to provide 
infrastructure funds to meet local development needs to deliver resources” (Brautigam, 2009). 
 
However, it would be false to portly China-Zambia relations as always very perfect. In some 
incidents the unethical practices of some Chinese companies operating in Zambia stands to be a 
challenge on the view that China-Zambia cooperation is an all economic win-win relationship, and 
a new strategic partnership in the interest of the Zambians, at least, the majority of local Zambians. 
It should be pointed out that the suitability of China’s development strategies for African countries 
is still not very clear and hence debatable. This is partly because some essential factors such as 
infrastructure development, capital investments, large market and growing neighboring economies 
which has played significant roles in China’s extraordinary economic growth rate, are deficient in 
most economies in Africa. 
To show how China’s aid to Zambia is not all beautiful, in 2011 the Human Rights Watch released 
a detailed report reviling the extensive labor abuse, union collapse and ‘poverty wages’ paid by 
some Chinese mining firms to their Zambian employees. Also in the report included the 
subsidiaries of China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining Company (CNMC) a State-owned enterprise 
(SOE)60 unethical vices. According to the report, there was overwhelming evidence suggesting 
that salaries paid by CNMCs subsidiaries in Zambia were among the lowest wages paid by foreign 
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mining firms operating in Zambia. Further, the report stated that some Chinese employers in 
Zambia denied to allow their employees from joining any trade union. More distressing revelations 
were revealed of the worse working conditions, longer working hours with no rest, no paid 
holidays, and no retirement benefits to some Zambian employees in the Nonferrous China Africa 
(NFCA) a subsidiary of CNMC. 
Therefore it is important that the People’s Republic of China’s government, the Chinese companies 
and the government of Zambia cooperate to adequately address these shortcomings. Certainly at 
the moment that is what is being done, but the process has to be dealt with urgently. In a keynote 
address in Sanya, President Lungu stated that “Chinese firms in Zambia should respect local 
Zambian laws, and should use local laborers and local contractors in order to ensure that China-
Zambian relations is in the interest of both countries”61. It can be questioned as to what extent the 
president’s comments will be implemented as to improve on previous positive actions from the 
Chinese companies in Zambia is still yet to be seen but surely the relationship of the two 
governments is still very strong. 
China’s constant growing economic power over the past three decades has been impressive and it 
is of no doubt that its keen interest in deepening ties with Zambia has led to a growing presence of 
numerous Chinese investment in Zambia. While Chinese capital is evidently benefit the Zambian 
economy and her local citizens, but the practices of some Chinese companies stationed in Zambia 
draw some doubts on the claims that this economic based partnership is good for both sides. More 
still has to be done by the existing governments so as for the Chinese and Zambian people to 
equally benefit from the cooperation. 
                                                          
61 ZambiaReports News 
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V. Case Studies of Chinese Foreign Aid to Zambia 
The criteria used to derive on this three cases studies was mainly based on the conclusive 
observation and availability of the information on specific cases. After carefully understanding the 
donor’s motives in this case China and also understanding the approaches a recipient country like 
Zambia base its selection of aid donor, three main criterial have been recognized each feature 
representing one case study 1. Loan funded project; constructing of TAZARA Railway, 2) Grant 
plus Loan: Lusaka General Hospital, and 3) Grants; education scholarship programs. 
 
 
i. Infrastructure: The TAZARA Railway 
The TAZARA Railway was designed and constructed between 1968 and 1976. The 1,860 km long 
project was built with financial and technical assistance from China, amounting to over 
US$400million, in the form of a long-term interest-free loan. Known as the "Freedom Railway" 
or the Great Uhuru Railway (by the Tanzanians), TAZARA was conceived to provide the critical 
outlet to the sea that landlocked Zambia needed in order to break free from its dependency on 
Rhodesian, Angolan and South African rails and ports that proved to be very inconvenient and 
expensive for the cooper rich Zambia. TAZARA was therefore a transnational as well as a Pan-
African project, intended to serve as a symbol of revolutionary Third World solidarity and 
resistance to the forces of colonialism, neocolonialism and imperialism.  
China’s participation in this and other projects, which also included sending technical experts and 
doctors to Africa and granting Africans with scholarships for study in China, had less to do at the 
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time with economic considerations than with political ones: it formed an obvious part of Beijing’s 
ideological strategy to counter the influence of the Soviet Union in East Africa. Moreover, the 
support of African countries was sought and needed to bolster Beijing’s attempts to reclaim its seat 
in the United Nations (Brautigam, 2009). 
A link between Zambia and Tanzania had originally been envisaged by Cecil Rhodes but this 
imperial dream was never realized. Between 1963 and 1966 a number of feasibility studies for the 
construction of the line were conducted both the Zambian and Tanzanian engineers and then  
requests for finance were submitted to Britain, the United States, Canada, West Germany, France, 
the Soviet Union the World Bank, and the African Development Bank. But no firm offers were 
received from any of these and the Tanzanian and Zambian Governments therefore turned to China. 
After numerous discussions a Chinese team arrived in August 1965 to briefly study conditions of 
the Tanzanian section of the proposed project. In September 1967 a tripartite agreement was signed 
in Peking China under which China undertook to make a full survey of the line and formally 
committed itself to build and finance the railway. Further negotiations between the three countries 
in April 1968 (Dar es Salaam) and November 1969 (Lusaka) led to the signing of the final 
agreement in July 1970 (Peking). 
The cost of the railway was estimated at US$400 million and if the actual costs were higher than 
the extra sum would be given by China as a grant. The GBP400 million was provided in the form 
of an interest-free loan, since the Chinese never charged interest on any of the aid they provided. 
The loan would be repayable over thirty years, after a grace period of a decade, which meant that 
repayments would be due between the years 1983 and 2012. During the 1980s, a number of multi-
national agreements, this time including Western donors as well, saw to it that the operational costs 
of the railway, acquisition of rolling stock and other expenses were met. 
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Construction of the railway began in April 1970 and work proceeded ahead of schedule with the 
track crossing into Zambia in August 1973. In terms of engineering, the construction was no small 
feat, particularly on the Tanzanian section where the track rises from sea level to almost 6,000 feet. 
All in all, 22 tunnels and 300 bridges needed to be built in Tanzania alone. Up to 15,000 Chinese 
and 45,000 local workers were engaged on the project during the peak period. The railway was 
completed in 1975 and operations began in July 1976. 
Following the formal transfer of the railway in 1976, some 1,000 Chinese experts originating from 
36 different railway "work units" (danwei) throughout China, stayed on in either Tanzania or 
Zambia as Chinese Railway Experts to continue the task of technology transfer in the operations 
period. These Experts Teams operated under the immediate leadership of the Chinese Embassy 
and its Economic and Commercial Representative in Tanzania. In China they were directly 
affiliated with the Department of Foreign Aid of the Ministry of Railways; after 2003, they were 
administered by the China Civil Engineering Construction Company (CCECC) under the authority 
of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) and the Ministry of 
Commerce. 
At present, TAZARA is still in operation, having survived falling revenues, maintenance backlogs, 
worker discontent over reduction and pension plans, etc. Its operating costs have been secured 
with a new infusion of Chinese financial aid (US$ 40 million in December 2010), leading to the 
projection that the operation will turn a profit in 2011, for the first time since the railway was taken 
into operation. 
Although TAZARA is still seen as China’s most ambitious project in Africa, its functions have 
evolved from an idea-political one into an economic one, emphasizing resource acquisition. In the 
process, the China’s involvement has shifted from active participation in surveying and 
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construction, to undertaking joint-management with the African partners, to providing 
management advice and technical guidance. As such, it very much reflects the past five decades 
of development of Zambia and also changes in China itself. On both ends of the railway, China 
has developed, or is in the process of developing, Special Economic Zones that will facilitate 
further economic growth for all the three countries. Now that China is increasingly interested in 
economic cooperation with African nations, TAZARA serves as a powerful symbol of Beijing’s 




ii. Health: Lusaka General Hospital 
In this case study an example of mix type of aid by China is depicted. It is mixed because this 
official assistance does combine the grant aid and consensual loan given to the Zambian 
government.  Even though this case study lacks adequate information in terms of figure, it is 
estimated that the Lusaka General Hospital aided by the Chinese government loan amounting to 
about $8 million. The construction of the first ever general hospital in the capital was first started 
in 2009 was completed in 2011 and the construction was done by the China Jiangsu International. 
The Lusaka General Hospital rests on 1.84 hectare of land along Great East road in the Zambian 
capital Lusaka, with floor space of about 7,472 square meters. The hospital is equipped with CT, 
X-ray, 4 surgery rooms and 159 beds, casualty, dental and maternity wards as well as laboratories, 
combining medical and emergency together and with daily outpatient capacity of 477 person-times. 
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The hospital being now the second largest in the city treats 2,600 patients and delivers 260 babies 
each month on average and among the 477 staffs, 11 are Chinese. 
In commissioning the opening of the newly constructed hospital, the then Zambian president 
Rupiah Banda mentioned of how “Zambia has over the years enjoyed the all-weather bilateral 
friendship with China, which is based on mutual benefits of the two peoples, and the commission 
of the Lusaka General Hospital will largely improve health delivery system and bring access to 
cost effective health care to the country”.62 He further thanked the Chinese government and people 
for the generosity and their continuous effort in helping Zambia in the health sector. 
While speaking at the same event, then Chinese Ambassador to Zambia Zhou Yuxiao said “the 
construction of Lusaka General Hospital is one of the major contents from the Forum on China–
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the health sector is one of the priority areas of the bilateral 
cooperation between China and Zambia’.63 He further assured China's continuous support in the 
health sector to the southern African country, while 11 doctors will be deployed at the Lusaka 
General Hospital and the 16th Chinese Medical Team of 28 doctors is due to departure China for 
Zambia. 
Construction of Lusaka General Hospital is not the only assistant received from China in the health 
sector.420 Chinese volunteer doctors in 15 groups have worked in rotation in Zambia since 1978. 
These medical personnel’s work in various health institutions all over the country; like  in the 
University Teaching Hospital, Ndola Central Hospital, Livingstone General Hospital, Kitwe 
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Central Hospital and Kabwe General Hospital. They carry out mostly complicated diagnoses and 
treatment to patients of different kinds, also conducting sophisticated surgeries, and train 
thousands of local health practitioners. Additionally China has provided the Zambian government 
with a preferential loans to build mobile hospitals. These mobile hospitals have been set up and 
they are serving in different provinces to offer good and affordable health services to patients in 
remote rural areas.64 Furthermore, an Anti-malaria Center has been built with China’s assistance 
in Zambia’s National Malaria Control Center, facilitating scientific researches and experiment on 
prevention and treatment of malaria and batches of anti-malaria drugs have been donated by China 
since 2006. 
In the ambition to make the Lusaka General Hospital into a first ever Zambia ultra-modern 
Hospital, the Zambian government in conjunction with the Chinese government on March 28th 
2015 agreed to commence the expansion project of the Hospital. With the budget estimated at $90 
million, China has already promised a grant of USD $8 million (10 million Yuan) to undertake the 
restock of the Lusaka General Hospital with advanced medical equipment and supplies.  
Chinese experts have since visited the country to assess the re-designing the General Hospital, 
which will be expanded into a specialist hospital at a cost of US$90 million. The hospital will be 





                                                          
64 Ibid. 
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iii. Education: Chinese Scholarship for Zambians 
Scholarship program for Zambian students is another good example of grant aid given to Zambia 
by the Chinese government. In April this year ambassador Yang Youming emphasized that China 
and Zambia cooperation covers all fields including education.65 Since 1978, China has provided 
584 scholarships to Zambian students including the 32 scholarships this year. The scholarships 
range in different fields of University studies. About 400 Zambian students are currently studying 
in Chinese universities under the Chinese government scholarship for both undergraduate and post 
graduate programs. According to the records at the Chinese embassy in Lusaka, China trains about 
200 Zambians annually; has helped build two rural schools in Kapiri Mposhi district and Lusaka 
respectively; has constructed an agricultural technology demonstration center and set up a 
Confucius Institute in University of Zambia (UNZA)66 
China does realize and appreciate the importance of education to the country’s economic 
development, hence China’s bilateral relationship with Zambia is also very much based on 
education. By offering free scholarships to many Zambian young brilliant students, China uses this 
stratagem as on mean of technology transfer, in most high demand majors like computer sciences 
and technology, engineering, medicine and economics. This can be inferred from a simple statistics 
that from 1978 up to 2015, Chinese government has made 700 scholarships available to Zambia, 
about 160 of the scholarship students studied and are studying medical science in China. Also on 
average of 40 students annually who are going to study on Chinese government scholarships, 13 
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of them major in medicine. The medical scholarships are aimed at helping Zambia’s capacity-
building in the health sector, which is equally essential for keeping the nation health.67 
In the tradition annual address to the new scholarship students, the Chinese ambassador always 
emphasizes to the students to be patriotic and be able to come back and serve Zambia after 
successful completion of their studies. Based on the specialties they have chosen which include 
engineering, medicine, information technology, finance, international trade, and international 
politics. The ambassador points out how Zambia is a promising country of development and there 
are broad prospects of cooperation in various fields between China and Zambia. Thus great 
opportunities lie ahead for you to display your talents the ambassador claims. “I am looking 
forward to your smooth accomplishment of study in China, and afterwards your commitment to 
the strengthening of exchanges and cooperation between China and Zambia, your great 
contribution to China-Zambia friendship and to the growth of Zambia”.68 
According to the Statistical Office, now about 1700 Zambian students, including scholarship and 
self-sponsored students, are studying in China. This soling figures does not only demonstrate the 
close people-to-people exchanges between China and Zambia, but also a great inspiration for two 






                                                          
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 




In this chapter, the paper does openly look into intensive possible future outcomes and predictions 
on the bilateral relationship of China and Zambia. This paper did not just focus on the analytic side 
of the follow of China’s aid to Zambia, but also the importance of structural changes in how the 
well the cooperation can of great benefit to both parties.  
On the first instance, ‘China’s aid a good alternative for Zambia’ will be investigated thoroughly 
and a conclusion will be reached. Secondly the core theme of China’s aid ‘Mutual benefit and win-
win’ will be challenged and on this too the paper will provide a conclusion. Finally the third aspect 
will be a prediction centered answering ‘what lies ahead for China-Zambia Relations?’    
 
 
i. China’s Aid a good alternative for Zambia 
From the analysis this far, it is clear that Zambia has found a good friend in the Chinese and seems 
to enjoy every bit of the foreign aid interactions. Thus, Zambia has ignored the relations with the 
western traditional donors when it comes to issues concerning its development desire. 
To understand why China’s style of aid has extremely attracted ‘the hungry for development’ 
Zambia, revisiting China’s foreign aid policies by looking into the famous China’s “Eight 
Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to other Countries”69: 
                                                          
69 2011 White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid 
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1.  The Chinese government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual 
benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms 
but as something mutual. 
 
2. In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese government strictly respects the 
sovereignty of recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges. 
 
3. China provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low interest loans, and extends 
the   time limit for the repayment when necessary so as to lighten the burden on recipient countries 
as far as possible. 
 
4. In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese government is not to make 
recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark step by step on the road of self-
reliance and independent economic development. 
 
5. The Chinese government does its best to help recipient countries complete projects which 
require less investment but yield quicker results, so that the latter may increase their income and 
accumulate capital. 
 
6. The Chinese government provides the best-quality equipment and materials manufactured 
by China at international market prices. If the equipment and materials provided by the Chinese 
government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese government 
undertakes to replace them or refund the payment. 
63 | P a g e  
 
 
7. In giving any particular technical assistance, the Chinese government will see to it that the 
personnel of the recipient country fully master the technology. 
 
8. The experts dispatched by China to help in construction in recipient countries will have 
the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country. The Chinese experts are not 
allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities64. 
 
Although Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai announced these principles in 1964, many years before the 
OECD Accra High Level Forum (HLF) during a visit to Ghana, nine years earlier in India, he 
announced the similar “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”.70 
1. Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity 
2. Mutual non-aggression 
3. Non-interference in each other’s internal affairs 
4. Equality and mutual benefit 
5. Peaceful coexistence 
 
These two major announcements are the philosophical guidelines of China’s aid policies, and two 
major features, 1) non-conditionality and 2) non-intervention, that distinguish it from the existing 
aid architecture. 
 
                                                          
70 http://www.zhouenlaipeaceinstitute.org/en/five-principles-of-peace-2/ 
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The rigidity by the Chinese governments to always abide to the philosophical guidelines of its 
foreign aid policies has surely been the main reason developing countries in three major regions: 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America are very attracted to it.  
Like other African countries, Zambia’s aid dependence on China’s aid has been increasing 
continuously71  simply because of the discipline China upholds in sticking to the underlined 
principles are clear and straight forward. While unlike the unfair conditionalities and conflicting 
ideology intervention approach by the traditional aid donors from the west. Furthermore the 
culmination of Sino-African cooperation which was the first ministerial conference of Forum on 
China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), held in Beijing in October 200072. Its creation was suggested 
by a number of African countries including Zambia, was created “In order to further strengthen 
the friendly cooperation between China and Africa under the new circumstances, to jointly meet 
the challenge of economic globalization and to promote common development.”73The FOCAC is 
also just another assurance Zambia has to know and trust that China’s flow of investments and aid 
is never stopping anytime soon, it will last longer. 
The underlined “equality and mutual benefit” in the preamble of the MoU between China and 
Zambia, promotes both political dialogue and economic cooperation and trade, with a view to 
seeking mutual reinforcement and common development.74” Clearly, China is being seen as an 
alternative source of development assistance due to its aid policies which stand in stark contrast to 
those of OECD DAC donors. 
 
                                                          
71 Zambia Development Agency. See www.zda.org.zm 
72 See. http://www.focac.org/eng/ 
73 Ibid. 
74 2011 White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid 
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ii. ‘Mutual Benefit and Win-Win’ 
The center phrase of “Mutual Benefit and Win-Win” in most speeches given by high officials from 
both the Zambian and Chinese side in reference to the long existing bilateral relationship is of great 
importance, hence deserve being questioned. Some practices of some Chinese companies in 
Zambia,  however portray some of the negativities of China’s capital flow in Zambia and which 
leads into questioning the authenticity of widely held belief that China’s investment in Zambia as 
that of other African countries is a “mutual benefit and win-win” for economic cooperation. A 
good example would be the commonly referred to incidents; in the year 2005, 51 Zambian copper 
miners were killed while working in a Chinese explosive factory in the copperbelt, Zambia’s 
copper rich province. In 2010, two Chinese coal mine managers, Xiao Li Shan and Wu Jiu Hua, 
were charged with attempted murder for shooting 11 Zambian workers who were protesting over 
poor pay and work conditions at the Collum coal mine in the country’s southern town of 
Sinazongwe.75 
In 2011, Human Rights Watch released a report76 detailing extensive labor abuse, union busting 
and ‘poverty wages’ paid by some Chinese mining companies to their Zambian employees, 
including subsidiaries of China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining Company (CNMC) a State-owned 
enterprise (SOE). According to the report, there was extensive evidence suggesting that wages 
paid by CNMCs subsidiaries in Zambia were among the lowest wages paid by foreign mining 
companies operating in Zambia. Further, the report argues that some Chinese employers in Zambia 
                                                          
75 Read full story on http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/china-zambia-and-a-clash-in-a-coal-mine 
76 See. “You’ll Be Fired if You Refuse” Labor Abuses in Zambia's Chinese State-owned Copper Mines 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/11/04/youll-be-fired-if-you-refuse/labor-abuses-zambias-chinese-state-owned-
copper-mines 
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refused to allow their employees to join any trade union. More distressing details were revealed of 
the appalling working conditions, long working hours with no rest, no paid holidays, and no 
retirement benefits to some Zambian employees in Nonferrous China Africa (NFCA) a subsidiary 
of CNMC. 
 
However, some of the shortcoming of CNMCs activities and the poor labor and environmental 
practices in other Chinese companies operating in Zambia might lead into arguing the claims that 
Chinese capital in Zambia is an economic “mutual benefit and win-win” might be based on 
sweeping generalizations and are questionable. Again, this is not to argue that all Chinese capital 
in Zambia is not in the interest of local Zambians, far from it, given that strong evidence to showing 
that China’s capital has significantly benefited the Zambian people, but instead the analysis is to 
challenge the relevant stakeholders to rethink; to what extent is Chinese capital in Zambia an 
economic “mutual benefit and win-win”, new and in the interest of local Zambians? And what can 
be done to mitigate the negativities associated with some Chinese capital, in order to establish 
sincere and economic win cooperation. 
There is evidence that efforts are being made by the Chinese and Zambian governments to ensure 
that Chinese companies operating in Zambia comply with local labor and environmental 
regulations and for sure some companies are changing their labor relations with local employees. 
For example, in 2007, NFCA arrived at an agreement with its employees to transfer the majority 
of its casual workforce to permanent contract basis. Further, in 2009, CNMC released a statement 
indicating that it would outsource 75% of its non-vital works to local Zambian contractors. These 
efforts are indicative of arguments that Chinese firms in Africa, including those in Zambia, are 
undergoing a gradual learning process to improve their relations with local stakeholders. 
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(Brautigam, 2009). But still more work still has to take place in the interest of local Zambians. It 
is therefore important that the Chinese government, Chinese companies and the Zambian 
government collaborate to adequately address these shortcomings. In a keynote address in Sanya, 
President Lungu emphasized to the audience that Chinese firms in Zambia should respect local 
Zambian laws, and should use local laborers and local contractors in order to ensure that China-
Zambian relations is in the interest of both countries.  
China’s growing economic power over the past three decades and its keen interest to deepen ties 
with Zambia has with no doubt led to a growing presence of Chinese companies investing in 
Zambia. While Chinese capital has evidently benefited the Zambian economy and local Zambians, 
the practices of some Chinese companies in Zambia cast doubts on the claims that this cooperation 
is good for both sides. More still has to be done by the relevant stakeholders from both countries 
for the Chinese and Zambian people to equally benefit from the relations. Only then will the 




iii. What lies ahead for China-Zambia Relations? 
There is no doubt that China-Zambia bilateral relationship will continue; China providing aid in 
form of massive capital, while Zambia enjoys the FDI and this will be the description of the vicious 
circle. But as Zambia being the sole focus of this thesis, there are advices on provided in this 
session that will help this potential young country escape the aid trap and achieve economic 
development through participation in fair trade. 
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a. Aid and effective policies 
 
(Boon, 1996) was one of the first scholars to consider the relation between aid and political 
environment. He was extremely critical to the effects of foreign aid to political institutions. But 
most interesting Boone has stated that aid does not significantly increase investment and growth, 
nor benefit the poor as measured by improvements in human development indicators, but it does 
increase the size of government. He further emphasize that the impact of aid does not vary 
according to whether recipient governments are liberal democratic or highly repressive. This may 
be due to greater empowerment of the poor under liberal regimes even though the political elite 
continues to receive the benefits of aid programs. An implication is that short term aid targeted to 
support new liberal regimes may be a more successful means of reducing poverty than current 
programs77. Considering this intensive literature by Peter Boon, it is up to Zambia to take up the 
challenge and analyze its dependence on China’s aid. With all the inflow of the Chinese capital, is 
the distribution fair enough to benefit more of the Zambian ordinary citizens or maybe as Boon 
put it; the Zambian political elites benefiting more from the aid while only a small share is divided 
to the majority poor. Now for the foreign from China and elsewhere to work effectively for Zambia, 
a good enough governing system has to be in place. 
 
Several scholars of foreign aid have included the political environment aspect to the analysis of 
aid effectiveness like similar of what Boone78 mentioned. (Craig Burnside, 2000) Follows a much 
more liberal perspective and does find a relation between growth and aid. Their main argument is 
                                                          
77 Boone, P. (1996). Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid. European economic review, 40(2), 289-329. 
78 Ibid. 
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that “aid accelerates growth in developing countries with sound institutions and policies, but has 
less or no effect in countries in which institutions and policies are poor”. This result is argued to 
be quite intuitive; a corrupt, incompetent government is not going to use aid wisely and outside 
donors are not going to be able to force it to change its habits. True to this assumption, Zambian 
government has to free its self from corrupt officials selfishly benefiting from the aid resources 
meant for good intentions. It is never China’s duty to clear up the Zambian system from corruption 
or misappropriate of aid allocations. As long as aid is a business, it is not the donor’s burden to 
make aid work, as long as its profiting more out of the aid the problem will always be on the receipt 
government.  
“Selectivity” approach does not apply to China’s aid, but it should be the recipient government to 
set up mechanisms that will question the accountability and transparency of the aid monitoring 
system. 
   
In line of establishing good institutions for good aid monitoring and management, scholars have 
usually arrive to two important problems when analyzing suggestions made by (Craig Burnside, 
2000). The first one is how to define “good institutions”. In this sense some researchers question 
the long list of “things that must be done” and the casual chain from good governance to 
development, by exploring the particular histories of developed countries, suggesting that specific 
conditions of good governance are basic characteristics needed for sustained development. For 
example, secure property rights and contracts, while other governance factors emerge over time in 
conjunction with or in consequence of economic growth and poverty reduction. Furthermore the 
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World Bank has suffered much criticism by prescribing a model of governance based on Western 
values of democracy and free market.79 
 
The second problem is the idea of selectivity. Assuming that the foreign aid will just have a positive 
impact on countries with a sound policy, countries with “bad policies will be excluded of aid, then 
what to do with their population. The Paris declaration has embodied the principle of selectivity 
in order to improve the quality of aid and specially to serve as an incentive to countries with poor 
policies, to pursue the improvement of the institutions. But in this second problem considering 
China’s lack of concern of selectivity in its foreign aid policy, it is up to Zambia to adapt commonly 




Considering lack of access available data on foreign aid flow to Zambia either from China or other 
traditional donors, it is unarguable that Zambia has the ownership problem with concern to foreign 
aid. Van de Walle80 considers that ownership is of the main problems of effectiveness of foreign 
aid in Africa. In accordance with this author, recipient governments have the ownership of a 
financial activity of the foreign aid when they are convinced that the aid will enforce their power 
and their interest.81 The simple reality is that if a country owns a program, it has the right to insist 
                                                          
79 Ibid. 
80 See. Van de Walle, Nicolas, and Lise Rakner. "Zambia." In Aid and Reform in Africa, 
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on making the final decisions without coercion on the contents of a program. In addition, if a 
recipient country like Zambia accept the full ownership of whatever aid funded program, it will  
accept without coercion the obligation to take full responsibility for the outcome of the program 
and hence for the welfare consequences to its citizens and for certain external effects on 
noncitizens. Furthermore, the right to ownership and obligation would be generally acknowledged 
by all other parties such as creditors, international organizations, and other countries who have 
anything to do with the program.82 
 
All in all, it would be a great approach if Zambia also learns from China’s past experiences in 
relations to aid recipient. It is astonishing how China even though is in still considered a developing 
country, it has arguably the second largest economy, distribute aid to numerous countries, but it’s 
successive history is not long enough. This has all been possible of because of strategic approaches 
China takes. For example;   
Chinese leaders had a solid idea of the type of assistance they needed from the Soviet Union when 
they were aid dependents. In 1948 then President of the People’s Republic of China, Liu Xiaoqi, 
laid out four specific requests for assistance from the Soviet Union: (1) Introduction of the Soviet’s 
experience in converting to a socialist economy; (2) dispatch of Soviet advisors and experts to 
China; (3) transfer of capital; and (4) assistance in formulating China’s economic plans. China was 
keen on following the Soviet Union model while also maintaining its ownership over the assistance. 
Chinese leaders saw foreign aid as an effective tool in acquiring what they needed and took 
initiative in asking for specific requests. 
                                                          
82 Johnson, O. E. (2005). Country ownership of reform programmes and the implications for conditionality. UN. 
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This Chinese approach in 1948 can be possible today, and the Zambian government can make 





Throughout this paper, almost all the studies reviewed and the full descriptive analysis have in 
common the analysis of the role of aid under macroeconomic aspects. This study may be 
considered a simplistic view because it started with the assumption that just a flow of capital from 
China entering the treasures of the recipient country Zambia can have a positive effect that would 
generate the economic growth and that economic growth would reduce poverty. Paradoxically, 
existing evidences show that most of these assumptions did not hold much grip due to lack of 
intensive data or previous non-biased researches made on China’s aid. 
In this accord, it is very important that the limitations encountered while writing this thesis be 
registered as part of the conclusion. Firstly on the availability of the useful data, literatures both 
print and non-print from both countries of focus (Zambia and China) was very discouraging and 
frustrating, as there was or is no much primary sources for scholarship. In the case of this would 
be assumed to as the result of strict monitoring and restrictions of dissemination of information 
pertaining to the government as the communist government keep the closure policies. Furthermore, 
the readily available scholarly works (by mostly Western scholars) is not much to admire as there 
are numerous loopholes of dishonesty or simply biasness in the writings. Hence the challenges 
encountered while trying to thoroughly examine through all the publications related to the topics 
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of interest. On the other hand, Zambia is the opposite of the communist controlled China. In the 
case of Zambia the government is open but even though it may seem to have all the information 
needed to be easily accessed, the opposite is the reality, there is no impressive effective information 
available. Unfortunate this is the country even in 51years of independence still have non-functional 
websites, and if lucky on certain days the relevant websites were accessed, there was no much 
information at all worth using as references or in the literature reviews. Most of the government 
official websites are not far much different from that of a young youth old myspace page, as there 
were no frequent updates of the page and most depressing is the lack of relevant quarterly or annual 
detailed reports. Non the less, despite these setbacks the primary sources were gathered from the 
Zambian local newspapers, interviews with a government official in the ministry of Finance and 
National Planning and also of course from the country in the International Organizations (World 
Bank, United Nations, International Monitory Fund, and OECD). Just has the situation with 
China’s data, consciousness of possible fabrications in the available data and literature was 
observed so as not to write a one-sided view of the world wide known state of Zambia.    
The Big Push Theory was the main theory used as the bases of the paper, arguing that the more 
capital flow a donor country pumps in a recipient, the more likely the indicators of development 
will be noticed. On the other hand it is arguable if all the huge monies spent on infrastructure 
development in Zambia by the Chinese capital can be used as a bases of proving Zambians life 
improvement and poverty reduction.  Because there GDP is not impressively improved as expected 
to be. 
By examining China-Zambia cooperation in three case studies, the different ideologies, modalities, 
and mechanisms that make up the new Chinese aid paradigm are made readily clear. It is true that 
China’s self-interest drives much of its aid, but manifests itself in a much different way by non-
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conditionality and non-intervention. Additionally, the research did vigorously explore why 
China’s aid approach is different from that of the OECD DAC. Further areas of research could 
examine the effects of Chinese aid policies on that of traditional donors, a comparison research. 
 
Also from the assumptions derived from the first ever white paper on China’s foreign Aid, all the 
principles inclined in the documents non conditionality and non-intervention were the main 
summary of the aid policies while emphasizing on mutual benefit and win-win. But this attractive 
sentiments have some fault too, like the practices of some Chinese companies with not regards of 
abiding by the Zambian laws, made the “mutual benefit and win-win” be doubted.  
Thus the failure to mitigate the occurrence of environmental pollution and labor abuses in some 
Chinese companies in Zambia might deprive local Zambian workers of their workers’ rights and 
might prevent local communities from benefiting from Chinese investment. It might also 
undermine the ability of the Zambian government to be the ‘responsible sovereign’ actor, that is, 
to protect the rights of its citizens and provide for their basic welfare and it might as well negatively 
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                                                                       국 문초록 
성명: 켄트 카마숨바 
학과 및 전공: 국제학과 국제협력전공 
서울대학교 국제대학원 
 
중국과 잠비아는 1964년 10월 29일에 외교 관계를 수립했다. 지난 51년 동안  중국과 
잠비아 정부 간부들은 이 관계가 중국과 잠비아 사람들에게 이익이며, 상호신뢰와 정치적 
평등 그리고 문화적 교류와 두 국가 모두에게 이익이 되는 경제적 협력을 나타내는 새로운 
타입의 좋은 협력이라는 것을 지속적으로 언급해왔다. 이것은 중국과 잠비아의 
쌍방관계가 어떻게 기부자 국가와 수혜자 국가 모두에게 이익이 되는 새로운 종류의 
관계인지에 대한  예를 보여준다. 
 ‘중국의 아프리카 정책 문서’ 에서 중국 정부는 잠비아와의 협력처럼 아프리카 
국가들과의 협력이 신실함, 우정, 평등, 상호 이익, 상호 교류, 공동 번영, 상호 지원 및 
양자간의 긴밀한 협력의 원칙에 기반해 있음을 강조한다.  
 중국정부와 잠비아 정부는 4 가지 정의 원칙을 고려해는데, 그 네 가지 원칙은 새로운 
종류의 협업, 상호 경제적 협동, 우정과 신실함, 상호 지원과 상호이익이다.   
이 양자 관계를 반영한 중국의 대외 원조는 막대한 자본 투자 흐름의 형태로 잠비아의 
경제 발전을 지속적으로 지원한다. 빅 푸시 이론(Big Push Theory) 을 활용한 서술적 단일 
82 | P a g e  
 
사례 연구(a Descriptive and Single Case-Study )를 사용하여, 이 논문은 언급된 원칙들이 
긍정적으로 잠비아에 도움이 되는지의 여부에 대해 밝히고자 한다.  
 
핵십어 
외국 원조 미국 잠비아 양자간 관계, 상호 득과 상생 협력의 경제 개발과 전략적 제휴. 
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